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Decision	cost Considered Irrelevant Not	considered Considered
Endowment Different	for	each	agent Not	considered Not	considered Equal	for	all	agents
Reward Different	for	each	agent Not	considered Not	considered Equal	for	all	agents
Unconditional
contribution
Impossible Possible Impossible Impossible






































































































































    
Create initial network (options: random network OR import-DLfile)
Unless maximum number of time steps (5000) has been reached, do:
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    Reset all agents' attributes
    Unless all agents have decided, eavh agent will:
        Scan neighborhood for counting deciders (B) and cooperators (C)
        Estimate the decision situation
        Make a decision about cooperation behaviour
        Record micro-decisional outcomes in a buffer-matrix
        Next agent
    Compute the turn macro-indicators from the buffer-matrix
    Update outputs and plotting
    Next turn





























































5 236 3902 862
6 21 838 3181 852 108





5 2279 2476 245
6 25 1155 3239 463 118





5 4143 624 233
6 3966 370 664
























































































4 113 899 3988
5 15 575 302 4108
6 106 1343 3551





5 2307 2432 261
6 29 1183 3194 480 114





5 2303 2508 189
6 19 1182 3186 485 128





5 4148 626 226
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6 3927 367 598 108






























































































k Situation Defect Cooperate Total
%	row %	col. %	row %	col. %	row %	col.
1 Situation	3 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
2 Situation	2 100% 8.7% 100% 2.9%
Situation	3 68.7% 100% 31.3% 91.3% 100% 97.1%
Total 66.7% 100% 33.3% 100% 100% 100%
3 Situation	1 100% 1.9% 100% 100%
Situation	2 100% 17.6% 100% 8.6%
Situation	3 55.3% 98.1% 44.7% 82.4% 100% 90.4%
Total 50.9% 100% 49.1% 100% 100% 100%
4 Situation	1 100% 4.8% 100% 2.1%
Situation	2 100% 17.7% 100% 9.9%
Situation	3 46.5% 90.1% 53.5% 82.3% 100% 85.7%
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Situation	4 100% 5.1% 100% 2.3%
Total 44.3% 100% 55.7% 100% 100% 100%
5 Situation	1 100% 15.5% 100% 7.2%
Situation	2 100% 25.6% 100% 13.7%
Situation	3 45.6% 71.6% 54.4% 74.4% 100% 73.1%
Situation	4 100% 100% 100% 4.7%
Situation	5 100% 2.8% 100% 1.3%
Total 46.6% 100% 53.4% 100% 100% 100%
6 Situation	1 100% 6.6% 100% 3.9%
Situation	2 100% 10.3% 100% 4.2%
Situation	3 46.1% 48.8% 53.9% 82.3% 100% 62.5%
Situation	4 81.1% 21.9% 18.9% 7.4% 100% 16,0%
Situation	5 100% 22.7% 100% 13.4%
Total 59.1% 100% 40.9% 100% 100% 100%
Note:	A	set	of	8	selected	networks	consisting	of	7	members	with	one	decision	each	per	round	and	5000	rounds	involves	a	total
of	280000	choices.	Each	of	these	decisions	(a)	has	occurred	in	one	of	the	5	decision	situations	and	(b)	has	been	to	co-operate
or	not	to	co-operate.	The	table	displays	both	the	row	and	column	percentage	cross-distribution	of	280000	decisions,
accounting	for	the	two	variables	and	controlling	by	6	levels	of	agents'	node	degree	(k).
6.38 Table	5	presents	behavioural	differences	as	a	function	of	agents'	node	degree	(k).	In	the	case	of	agents	with	ki	=1,	the	effective	cooperation	trigger	is	not
activated	because	m=3.	Pioneering	and	speculative	cooperation	will	not	be	triggered	either,	since	for	these	agents	B	and	C	only	have	values	0	or	1	and	no
combination	of	these	values	leads	to	a	criticality	calculus	favourable	to	cooperation.	Table	5	shows	that	agents	with	ki=1	are	always	in	the	same	situation	and
decide	in	favour	of	defection.	Given	the	large	number	of	agents	about	whom	they	have	no	information,	agents	consider	the	probability	of	their	contribution	being
critical	to	be	very	low.
6.39 For	agents	with	ki>1	the	range	of	possible	situations	is	broader,	which	favours	cooperation	in	some	cases.	For	example,	agents	with	ki=2	who	face	Situation	3
do	not	always	defect,	as	agents	with	ki=1	do.	In	fact,	the	combinations	B=2	&	C=1	and	B=2	&	C=0	favour	cooperation,	while	combinations	B=1	&	C=1,	B=1	&
C=0	and	B=0	&	C=0	lead	to	defection.	This	explains	why	agents	with	ki=2	in	Situation	3	co-operate	only	in	some	cases	(Table	5).	However,	agents	with	this
nodal	degree	may	also	face	Situation	2,	in	which	the	agent	believes	that	only	one	contribution	is	needed	to	reach	the	provision	point	and	cooperation	is	the
rational	decision.	In	other	words,	agents	with	ki=2	face	a	situation	where	both	speculative	cooperation	–when	the	combinations	of	B	and	C	hold–	and	effective
cooperation	can	be	triggered	–when	the	number	of	previous	cooperations	is	2,	that	is	m-1.	An	increase	in	the	nodal	degree	produces	a	broader	range	of	possible
situations	that	the	agent	faces,	some	of	which	favour	cooperation.
6.40 However,	the	case	of	ki=6	is	an	exception.	Figure	7	shows	that	the	probability	of	cooperation	decreases	for	these	agents.	Table	5	suggests	that	this	reduction	is
explained	by	the	relation	between	a	higher	ki	and	an	increased	proportion	of	occasions	in	which	agents	face	Situation	4	(C=m-n+B).	With	our	parameters	this
situation	is	produced	when	C=B-4.	This	occurs	in	three	situations:	with	C=0	&	B=4,	with	C=1	&	B=5,	and	with	C=2	&	B=6.	An	agent	with	ki=4	faces	only	one	of
these	situations	(C=0	&	B=4).	Agents	with	ki=5	and	ki=6	face	situations	C=0	&	B=4	and	C=1	&	B=5,	but	the	latter	has	a	higher	probability	of	encountering	a
combination	C=1	&	B=5	because	she	has	more	neighbours.	Defection	is	chosen	in	all	these	combinations	of	C	and	B.	As	long	as	the	majority	of	possible
combinations	of	C	and	B	in	Situation	4	lead	to	defection,	a	higher	ki	increases	the	relative	weight	of	these	combinations	in	these	situations.
6.41 In	short,	agents	that	are	linked	in	a	way	that	allows	them	to	obtain	significant	information	about	other	agents'	behaviour	are	aware	of	the	low	probability	that	the
provision	point	will	be	reached,	and	therefore	decide	not	to	contribute.	On	the	other	hand,	the	lack	of	information	that	characterises	the	less	connected	networks
favours	speculative	contributions.	When	ki=6	is	reached	the	possibility	for	triggering	speculative	cooperation	decreases.	Paradoxically,	in	this	case	we	found
that	constraining	the	level	of	information	generates	larger	social	benefits	–as	Elster	claims	(	1979,	2000)	–,	and	these	mechanisms	could	be	examined	at	a
detailed	level	by	means	of	computational	simulation.
	Conclusions	and	Further	Work
7.1 We	conclude	this	paper	by	highlighting	several	results	that	we	consider	especially	relevant.	Our	simulation	bears	witness	to	the	explanatory	power	of	the
structural	properties	of	a	social	system.	Rational	agents	with	an	identical	decision	algorithm	can	generate	very	different	social	outcomes	depending	on	the
relational	structure	in	which	they	are	embedded.
7.2 The	topology	or	structure	of	a	social	network	is	not	the	only	relevant	factor;	the	decision	sequence	ordering	is	also	essential.	An	important	aspect	of	the	decision
is	the	quantity	of	information	available	to	the	agent	at	the	moment	of	decision,	and	in	a	social	network	this	variable	depends	on	the	nodal	degree	of	the	agent
and	on	the	sequence	position	of	her	decision.	These	issues	can	be	addressed	through	the	analysis	of	dynamic	networks,	through	observation	or	simulation.
7.3 We	tend	to	think	that	the	lower	the	required	effort	level,	the	higher	the	probability	for	a	public	good	to	be	produced.	However,	our	research	suggests	that,	in	some
cases,	institutional	designers	should	balance	the	effort	level;	not	too	high	to	discourage,	nor	too	low	to	stimulate	a	defection	grounded	on	the	confidence	that
others	will	bear	the	cost.
7.4 The	results	of	our	simulation	runs	also	suggest	that	both	high	and	low	confidence	about	other	agents'	cooperation	can	have	a	negative	effect	on	the	probability
of	success	of	a	collective	action.	Intermediate	levels	of	confidence	seem	to	stimulate	more	cooperation	because	they	support	the	agent's	belief	that	her
contribution	is	relevant.
7.5 Social	groups	with	a	dense	structure	have	a	higher	probability	of	success	in	the	production	of	step-level	public	goods	because	neighbours	provide	useful
information	about	the	relevance	of	the	agent's	contribution.	However,	if	the	links	are	costly,	the	highest	number	of	links	does	not	necessarily	make	a	more
cohesive	group:	from	a	certain	degree	of	density	onwards,	the	probabilities	of	success	in	collective	action	do	not	change	significantly.
7.6 Groups	with	a	horizontal	structure	have	a	higher	probability	of	success	in	the	production	of	step-level	public	goods.	Poorly	connected	agents	have	little	useful
information	about	the	relevance	of	their	decision,	while	well-connected	agents	may	have	an	excess	of	information	such	that	they	may	be	aware	of	difficulties	that
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cannot	be	perceived	from	other	positions.	A	limitation	of	information	stimulates	agents	to	co-operate	because	they	ignore	certain	difficulties,	therefore	generating
a	socially	optimal	aggregate	effect.	In	other	words,	more	information	for	an	individual	does	not	always	generate	a	better	result	for	the	group.	This	conclusion	is	in
line	with	recent	findings	according	to	which	limited	information,	cognitive	or	social,	can	favour	the	evolution	of	cooperation;	for	example,	Horváth	et	al.	(2012)
have	shown	how	the	number	of	rounds	remembered	by	an	iterated	game	agent	does	not	monotonically	increase	the	likelihood	of	reaching	a	co-operative	state.
7.7 The	same	agents	that	fail	to	produce	the	public	good	in	a	simultaneous	or	cumulative	decision	sequence	ordering	could	succeed	when	they	are	situated	in
certain	networks,	with	relevant	implications	for	institutional	design	and	formulation	of	more	effective	social	policy	alternatives.
7.8 Once	we	have	proceeded	with	the	computational	replication	of	previous	laboratory	experiments,	our	next	goal	is	to	extend	the	model	and	the	study	with	further
ABM	possibilities.	For	instance,	in	future	versions	of	NetCommons	we	plan	to	include	a	new	agent	heterogeneity	assumption	regarding	expectations	of	others'
behaviour;	to	overcome	the	hypothesis	of	homogeneity	we	focus	on	certain	network	topology	types	and	we	introduce	network	size	as	a	parameter	under
scrutiny.
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	Notes
	1	Among	the	continuous	functions	there	are	also	important	differences	between	accelerating,	decelerating	and	linear	functions	(Heckathorn	1996;Linares	2007).
2	Taylor	(1987)	writes	that	when	we	are	interested	in	the	construction	of	a	bridge,	more	money	does	not	imply	more	bridges.	However,	extra	contributions	can
be	dedicated	to	making	a	better	bridge	(use	of	superior	materials	or	better	designs)	In	this	case,	we	would	have	a	"mixed"	form	public	good,	in	which	the	first
part	takes	the	form	of	a	SLG	followed	by	a	continuous	function	once	the	provision	point	is	reached.	In	experimental	terms,	this	has	been	made	concrete	in
different	"rebate	rules"	(Marks	and	Croson	1998).
3	Taylor	has	argued	(1987:	46)	that	lumpy	goods	are	often	best	modelled	by	the	Chicken	Game:	depending	on	the	expectations	regarding	the	contributions	of
other	gamers,	cooperation	may	be	the	preferred	option	for	a	rational	maximizing	utility	agent.
4	Some	models	have	demonstrated	the	positive	effect	on	cooperation	of	heterogeneity	with	regard	to	decisions	about	how	much	to	invest	(see,	e.g.,Cao	et	al.
2010;	Santos	et	al.	2008).	In	our	model,	however,	and	for	reasons	of	outcome	tractability,	all	agents	have	the	same	endowment	and	face	a	binary	decision	(fully
contribute	it	or	not	to	the	common	pool).
5	According	to	the	formalisation	of	our	model,	the	same	distribution	of	values	of	p	between	agents	of	a	given	network	would	entail	different	outcomes	depending
on	which	values	of	p	are	associated	with	agents	having	different	nodal	degrees.	Incorporating	the	assumption	of	heterogeneity	will	exponentially	increase	the
number	of	combinations	necessary	to	obtain	a	realistic	assessment	of	its	impact	on	the	success	rate.	Considering	also	that	our	ultimate	goal	is	to	test	the
relevance	of	the	structural	properties	of	the	network,	and	that	as	discussed	below	we	will	work	with	a	catalogue	of	230	networks,	it	seems	reasonable	to	choose
the	hypothesis	of	homogeneity	to	assure	the	analytical	tractability	of	the	model	outputs.
6	Regarding	the	latter,	this	situation	is	strategically	equivalent	to	a	simultaneous	decision.
7	In	NetCommons	this	sixth	situation	has	been	subsumed	in	Situation	4,	because	in	decisional	terms	the	result	is	the	same.
8	Comparing	the	"sequential	protocol"	ordering	and	our	network-dependent	sequence	ordering	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	In	sequential	protocol	ordering
there	is	no	necessity	for	a	p	parameter,	because	agents	know	which	information	others	have	at	the	moment	of	their	decision.
9	To	gain	access	to	the	full	catalogue	of	networks	used	as	input,	please	contact	the	authors	directly.
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